This article analyses the determinants of the voluntary online local budget transparency (OLBT) of Croatian local governments. Budget trans-
Introduction
Budget transparency (BT) and citizens' participation are critical elements for the efÞ cient public service delivery, government accountability and citizens trust, particularly at local government levels (e.g., OECD, 2017; Pina et al., 2010; Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007) .
Research on the determinants of BT is growing (e.g., Caba Pérez et al., 2005; Gandía & Archidona, 2008; Gesuele & Metallo, 2017; Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 2015) . The results at the local level are showing heterogeneity and dependency of determinants on the research context, e.g., voluntary vs. mandatory disclosure, date of publication, unit of measure, etc. (Alcaide- Muñoz & Rodríguez Bolívar, 2015; Alcaide Muñoz et al., 2017) . To assist practitioners, more research of determinants of local budget transparency (LBT) is needed (Pina et al., 2010) , especially in different research contexts.
The information and communication technologies (ICT) fostered the use of web-based tools, allowing governments to provide better information, facilitating citizens' access to information and enabling more constructive and effective participation in decision making (Wong & Welch, 2004) . Regardless, a relatively small number of studies focus on online BT (e.g., Caba-Pérez et al., 2008; García-Tabuyo et al., 2016; Laswad et al., 2005; Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 2015) , and none on voluntary BT in an ex-socialist, Þ scally centralized country. This paper explores the effect of selected independent variables on the level of voluntary online local budget transparency (OLBT), measured by the Þ ve local budget documents -the year-end report, mid-year report, budget proposal, enacted budget and citizens' budget -published annually on 556 Croatian municipalities' and cities' websites, using the 2015-2017 panel data.
The OLBT is deÞ ned as citizens' ability to use the local government units' (LGUs') websites to obtain complete, accurate, timely and understandable budget information (Kopits & Craig, 1998; OECD, 2017; Ott et al., 2017) . However, this analysis focuses only on timely and understandable presentation of documents (as Caba- Pérez et al., 2008; Laswad et al., 2005) . Due to time and funding constraints, the completeness and accuracy of the information is not analysed.
The next section presents the background and development of the hypotheses for the determinants of OLBT, the third offers the data description and the research methodology, the fourth provides results, and the Þ fth gives discussion and conclusion.
Background and Development of Hypotheses
There is no commonly agreed deÞ nition of BT, maybe because of its multidimensionality (Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 2015) and dependence on the research context. Although Þ scal and budget transparency are often used as synonyms (Alt et al, 2006; OECD, 2017) , Þ scal transparency is a wider concept, including the structures, functions, Þ nancial position and activities of government units and their economic and social implications (Kopits & Craig, 1998) . A growing number of authors are investigating the determinants of Þ scal transparency (Andreula et al., 2009; Esteller-Moré & Polo Otero, 2012) . However, the reported ambiguous Þ ndings (e.g. political ideology, residents' income) point to the importance of further research of the context and country-speciÞ c characteristics.
Theoretical Background
The information gap between citizens and the government is a major obstacle to effective and constructive public participation. The public-choice theory explains it as the principal-agent problem, arising when an agent (politician) decides on behalf of the principal (citizens) but attempts to act in his/her own interests, which may be contrary to the interests of the principal. The informational asymmetry is then to the advantage of the agent, and the principals cannot be sure that the agents always represent their interests (Groenendijk, 1997) . The Ferejohn (1999) model, in which the agent chooses how to make his/her actions evident to the principal, assumes that the incumbent is compensated with rents (re-election, advancement and current and future income) proportional to the scale of the government. The voters (also assumed to be self-interested) monitor the agents, because their wealth depends on the agents' actions (Laswad et al., 2005) . In this regard, voluntary disclosure has been seen as a method of reducing information asymmetry, limiting the arising conß icts (Zimmerman, 1977; Banker & Patton, 1987) .
Voluntary transparency can also be explained by legitimacy theory i.e. "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of any entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and deÞ nitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) . If threatened, agents will disclose information to promote their legitimacy (Patten, 1992; Deegan, 2002) . By voluntary transparency, they transmit the perception that their actions meet the principals' expectations, hoping to regain their conÞ dence, changing the negative perceptions and enhancing their legitimacy and reputation (De Araújo & TejedoRomero, 2016; Alcaide Muñoz et al., 2017) .
Development of Hypotheses
Motivated by the Þ ndings presented in Table 1 , showing the ambiguity and heterogeneity of individual studies, and considering principal-agent and legitimacy theories, six hypotheses are developed in accordance with often-used sociodemographic, Þ scal and political variables. Residents with higher incomes usually have greater Internet access and experience (Styles & Tennyson, 2007) , demand additional public services (Giroux & McLelland, 2003; Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007) and information (Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007) . By releasing information, politicians reduce the asymmetry and prove their legitimacy.
LGUs with lower residents' income p.c. are less likely to adopt progressive web design due to the lower demand (Ho, 2002) . In this regard, the technological and income levels are complementary (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2008) . While Guillamón et al. (2011) found no signiÞ cant correlation, Lowatcharin and MeniÞ eld (2015) showed a signiÞ cant positive correlation between residents' income p.c. and government transparency. Therefore, we assumed that:
H1. As residents' income p.c. increases, the level of OLBT increases.
Population
Larger
LGUs are more often pressured to provide information (Moon & Norris, 2005; Serrano-Cinca et al., 2008) , usually have higher revenues and an IT department (Caba-Pérez et al., 2008) . Serrano-Cinca et al. (2008) argue that conß icts of interest are more likely in more populated areas and the advantage of disclosing information is correspondingly greater.
Several authors found a positive and statistically signiÞ cant relationship between population and data availability (Guillamón et al., 2011; del Sol, 2013; Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 2015; De Araújo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016) . Therefore, we assumed that:
H2. As the population increases, the level of OLBT increases.
Access to the Internet
As the citizens' Internet access increases, governments are expected to offer additional information and services online (Pina et al., 2010) . New technologies facilitate online disclosure, especially in larger LGUs, reducing the costs of dissemination (García-Tabuyo et al., 2016) .
Studies showed a positive relationship between Internet access and online mandatory disclosure (Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 2015; García-Tabuyo et al., 2016) . Surprisingly, for voluntary online disclosure, García-Tabuyo et al. (2016) found a negative correlation. Therefore, we assumed that:
H3. As citizens' access to the Internet increases, the level of OLBT increases.
Fiscal Capacity
Fiscal capacity (FC) can be deÞ ned as the ability to raise revenues for public spending (Martinez-Vazquez & Timofeev, 2008) . The term Þ nancial autonomy could be used as a synonym (Tavares & da Cruz, 2014) . Residents' income p.c. is linked to the FC, since it implies higher tax and nontax revenues. Alcaide Muñoz et al. (2017) argue that larger cities are more likely to provide information, since they can afford it and that higher FC is followed by higher pressure to justify the use of resources, so agents are keen to show that they act responsibly.
There are various proxies for the FC. Guillamón et al. (2011) used p.c. tax revenues and obtained a positive correlation with Þ nancial transparency. Laswad et al. (2005) used general revenues minus intergovernmental transfers Þ nding no signiÞ cant correlation with voluntary Internet Þ nancial reporting. This study also uses operating revenues (excluding grants) as a proxy for FC. Therefore, we assumed that:
H4. As an LGU's Þ scal capacity increases, the level of OLBT increases.
Administrative Capacity
The administrative capacity largely deÞ nes the ability to produce budget documents. Tavares and da Cruz (2014) show its inß uence associating it with a more professional organization and IT educated staff. This paper assumes that LGUs with a larger number of employees can more easily disclose more information.
The proxy for administrative capacity here is the natural logarithm of the annual average number of employees in LGU bodies (based on hours worked). This variable has not been previously used as a determinant of LBT.
1 It assumes that LGUs with a larger number of employees have specialized staff able to devote additional time to OLBT. Therefore, we assumed that:
H5. As the number of employees in the LGU bodies increases, the level of OLBT increases.
Political Ideology
Wehner and de Renzio (2013) argue that BT has often been characterized as a bipartisan issue promoted by both the left and right, even if for different reasons. Alteration of power motivates BT, as all parties want to ensure access to information should they be voted out of power. In contrast, Caamaño-Alegre et al. (2013) and Guillamón et al. (2011) argue that left-wing parties/incumbents are more transparent, as they are more likely to expand public services.
While several papers did show a relationship between left-wing incumbents and greater transparency (e.g., Caamaño-Alegre et al., 2013; del Sol, 2013) , other showed the opposite (De Araújo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016 . Therefore, we assumed that:
H6. A right-wing political incumbent decreases the level of OLBT.
Data and Methodology
Besides the sample and methodology, this section shows an overview of the local government organization and BT in Croatia, and the information on the used variables.
Local Government and BT in Croatia
Croatia consists of 428 municipalities, 128 cities and 20 counties. The Budget Act (2008) with subsequent amendments and the Act on the Right of Access to Information (2013) require the online publication of a mid-year and year-end reports and the enacted budget. The Ministry of Finance (2012) recommended publishing budget proposals online and printing and/or posting the citizens' budgets online. However, no sanctions are imposed. This paper considers online publication of three mandatory (mid-year and year-end reports and the enacted budget) and two voluntary documents (budget proposal and citizens' budget).
Dependent Variable and Sample
The dependent variable (OLBT) is constructed by using the Online Local Budget Index (OLBI) , a simple data count index for 576 Croatian LGUs for three years (2015) (2016) (2017) . It measures the availability of Þ ve documents on LGUs websites (see Figure 1 ) chosen in accordance with the best international practices (e.g., OECD, 2002; IBP, 2016) and the Croatian legal requirements and recommendations. The annual OLBI ranges between zero and Þ ve (e.g., one if the LGU published one, Þ ve if it published Þ ve documents). The overall average OLBI has improved from 1.75 in 2015 to 3.1 in 2017. The most transparent were counties (average 4.6), followed by cities (3.7) and municipalities (2.8).
Here, the OLBI is a binary variable, where 1 = transparent LGU (publishing four or Þ ve documents) and 0 otherwise. This classiÞ cation is made since publication of four or Þ ve documents includes the publication of at least one voluntary document. First, it was tested if the variances of the OLBI changed signiÞ cantly, as the variable was collapsed from six observations to the binary outcome. The Þ rst population was divided into six groups (publishing 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 documents) and the second into two groups (1 = publishing 4 or 5 budget documents and 0 otherwise). The F-test conÞ rmed that variances of these two populations are equal. Therefore, the dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 (a transparent) or 0 (a nontransparent LGU).
The sample includes Croatian 428 municipalities and 128 cities. 
Independent Variables
The independent variables are residents' income (INC), population (POP), Internet access (INTERNET), Þ scal capacity (FC), administrative capacity (EM-PLOYEE) and political ideology (RIGHT) ( Table 2) To test whether the independent variables affect OLBT, an estimate of how the probability of the online publication of four or Þ ve documents depends on the level of independent variables is determined. Probit panel data analysis is used.
The following equation is estimated at the total sample level:
( 1) where P represents the probability that an LGU achieves a higher level of BT (i.e., publishing four or Þ ve budget documents online) and is a constant term, while the six independent variables are deÞ ned above. The seventh variable (i.e., CITY) denotes a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the LGU is a city and zero otherwise. This variable is not included once the equation is estimated separately at the city and municipality level. In equation (1), i represents the city or municipality, t time, and the parameters to be estimated, while e represents the error. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for dependent variable OLBT and the remaining six independent variables for the total (cities and municipalities), city and municipality samples. The mean value of OLBT is signiÞ cantly higher in the city sample than in the other two samples. The same Þ nding applies to the population, the number of employees in the LGU bodies and Internet access, pointing to the necessity of conducting additional empirical investigations separately for cities and municipalities. The correlation matrices for the total, city and municipality samples are presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively. They all conÞ rm that the selected variables, except for variable EMPLOYEE at the municipal level, have a statistical signiÞ cant linear relationship with OLBT and that the direction of relationship is as the theory suggests (e.g. positive for population). Additionally, due to the multicollinearity problems between our independent variables (e.g. income internet access, population employees) we have estimated four different models at the total (city+municipality), city and municipality level. Probit random effect models are estimated for the total (Table 7) , city (Table  8 ) and municipality (Table 9) samples. In each of these estimations, four different probit models are executed due to collinearity between the independent variables (e.g., residents' income p.c. is correlated with Internet access and the LGUs' Þ scal capacities); and their calculated marginal effects are presented.
Results
3 Table 7 . In the total sample (Table 7) , both population (with marginal effects ranging from 0.09 to 0.983) and residents' income p.c. (with marginal effects ranging from 0.415 to 0.434) have a positive and statistically signiÞ cant inß uence on the OLBT in all the estimated models. This Þ nding is in line with the Þ ndings (del Sol, 2013; Lowatcharin & MeniÞ eld, 2015; De Araujo & Tejedo-Romero, 2016) . In addition, Internet access (with marginal effects of 0.006), FC (with marginal effects of 0.117) and the number of employees in the LGU bodies (with marginal effects of 0.068) estimated in the separate models show a positive and statistically signiÞ -cant inß uence at all the usual signiÞ cance levels. This article thus reports the Þ rst statistically signiÞ cant Þ nding in the literature regarding the number of employees. By conÞ rming the positive inß uence of Internet access, the results are in line with García-Tabuyo et al. (2016 ), Caba-Pérez et al. (2008 and Lowatcharin and MeniÞ eld (2015) , while the results for FC are in line with Guillamón et al. (2011) . However, the political ideology variable has an expected negative sign in all the estimated models, but it is statistically signiÞ cant only in the models estimating the effect of population, FC and Internet access (it is not signiÞ cant in models with residents' income p.c.). Although the coefÞ cients for political ideology are rather similar in all four models, a robust conÞ rmation cannot be reported. Consequently, this hypothesis is only partially accepted, while the others are accepted.
TOTAL SAMPLE -ESTIMATED PROBIT RANDOM EFFECT MODELS WITH CALCULATED MARGINAL EFFECTS
The analysis of the city sample was conducted because the dummy variable denoting cities in the total sample was found to be signiÞ cant in three of four models, but the obtained results are identical to those reported for the total sample. However, in the city sample (Table 8) , residents' income p.c. has the highest marginal effect (ranging from 1.95 to 1.982), and the political ideology variable has a negative and statistically signiÞ cant inß uence only in models with population and Internet access (marginal effect of -0.27) and in the model with FC (marginal effect of -0.245). Finally, the results regarding the effect of the number of employees in LGU bodies are clearly driven by the effect in the city sample, in which a positive and statistically signiÞ cant marginal effect of 0.251 was reported. The results at the municipality level (Table 9) show the expected negative sign for political ideology, although the result was nonsigniÞ cant, leading to the conclusion that this variable does not inß uence the OLBT in any of the estimated four models. The same goes for employees of LGU bodies, which is why these two hypotheses at the municipality level are rejected. The Þ ndings might indicate that higher levels of OLBT are unaffected by ideology and the number of employees at the municipality level, but additional empirical research is needed to conÞ rm this conclusion. However, the results indicate other interesting Þ ndings. First, population and residents' income p.c. remain the most important determinants. Second, the calculated marginal effects are much lower in this sample. Third, the variable residents' income p.c. (marginal effects between 0.229 and 0.253) is the most inß uential. In the fourth model, residents' income p.c. accounts for all the varia-tions, leaving the number of employees in LGU bodies statistically nonsigniÞ cant. Fourth, both Internet accessibility (marginal effect of 0.003) and the proxy variable for FC (marginal effect of 0.074) remain statistically signiÞ cant with a positive sign.
Finally, in all three samples, residents' income p.c., population, Internet access and FC were always statistically signiÞ cant with the expected positive sign. However, residents' income p.c. has the strongest impact at the city and municipality levels. The current size and wealth of LGUs determine the level of OLBT and not, for example, the party afÞ liation of the incumbent. Since both Internet access and FC are theoretically a clear externality of size and wealth of LGU, this is further conÞ rmed in the empirical analysis.
Discussion and Conclusion
The paper addresses the determinants of voluntary OLBT in Croatian 428 municipalities and 128 cities in 2015-2017 period, using probit panel data models at three different sample levels to conÞ rm the proposed hypotheses.
The Þ rst hypothesis is accepted, i.e. residents' income p.c. has direct and indirect effects on voluntary OLBT. Directly, according to the principal-agent and legitimacy theories, it is expected that residents with higher incomes tend to expect additional public services, have more access to and experience using the Internet, demanding increased online budget information. However, there might be a low demand for budget information among ex-socialist citizens, often unaware of and unaccustomed to using their rights. According to the survey concerning citizen participation in Þ scal and budgetary processes in Croatia, 55% of the respondents believe that it is possible for citizens to be involved and 80% that citizens should be involved; however, a mere 7% have attempted to participate. Furthermore, especially in centralized countries, it is expected that citizens are less interested in LBT since less public goods are provided locally. In addition, according to the principal-agent and legitimacy theories, incumbents in LGUs with higher residents' income p.c. also have increased motivation to be voluntarily transparent. It is in their interest to disclose budget information to demonstrate how successfully they manage public funds.
Residents' incomes also indirectly affect OLBT through FC. Higher average residents' income p.c. leads to higher FC, enabling higher budget revenues and additional resources for voluntarily BT.
In all three samples, along with residents' income p.c., FC, population and Internet access were always statistically signiÞ cant with the expected positive sign. As argued in literature, higher income p.c. is directly linked to purchases of computers and technological devices. In such LGUs, due to greater Internet access, a higher demand for OLBT is expected. According to both principal-agent and legitimacy theories, higher voluntary OLBT is expected in LGUs with larger populations.
These results add to the literature. First, they prove that residents' income p.c. is a major determinant of voluntary OLBT in an ex-socialist, Þ scally centralized state (with numerous small LGUs, often with low capacities and uninterested citizens). Second, a positive effect of the proxy for an LGU's FC is empirically conÞ rmed in all three samples. Third, there is a clear positive effect of the number of employees in the LGU bodies on voluntary OLBT.
As voluntary OLBT is important for citizens' participation, government's accountability and efÞ ciency of public goods provisions, the Þ ndings offer policy implications. First, the number of LGUs with low Þ scal (and often administrative) capacity should be reduced through territorial and Þ scal reorganization (including mergers or joint provision of public goods). Second, it is necessary to promote BT in less developed cities/municipalities. Third, with improved BT, citizens should be able to engage and participate in the local budget processes. However, they should Þ rst be educated (e.g. through budget literacy programs).
The results are robust and signiÞ cant. However, with a longer time span and improved data availability, further studies might include qualitative analysis of the documents, employ other methods or analyse additional determinants (e.g. electoral cycles, education levels, civil society organizations' activities, indebtedness, corruption).
